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INTRODUCTION
Indigent defense in America “is in a chronic state of crisis.”1 The
persistence of severe underfunding and excessively large caseloads
have resulted in serious concerns regarding both the quality of
indigent representation and the ability of indigent defenders to
comply with their ethical and professional responsibilities to
clients.2 Despite decades of debate and study, the indigent defense
crisis remains one of this nation’s most pressing criminal justice
problems.3 This Note is concerned with one aspect of this longstanding crisis—the excessive caseloads that overburden indigent
defenders. It argues that, in the current economic climate,4 proposals aimed at resolving the indigent defense crisis must acknowledge
the inherent unlikelihood that adequate funding will materialize.5
Indeed, such proposals should focus on ways to maximize available
resources.6 The proposals to date recognizing the need to reduce
1. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS & BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND
INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS 5 & n.20 (1999), http://www.sado.org/fees/icjs.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,
A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045-1103 (2006) (framing the indigent defense
crisis as a problem of funding, caseloads, compensation, access to and quality of representation, and ethics and professional responsibility concerns).
3. Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
461, 465 & n.10 (2007) (“For years, indigent defense advocates have clamored for more
funding to address the crisis.”); NORMAN LEFSTEIN & ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG, NAT’L RIGHT
TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 50-51 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/
139.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED] (reviewing the types of studies that organizations have
conducted to document and address the indigent defense crisis).
4. See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Public Jobs Drop amid Slowdown in Private Hiring, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A1; Latest Developments—Economic Crisis and Market Turmoil, N.Y.
TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ subjects/c/credit_crisis/index.html
(last updated Oct. 3, 2011).
5. See Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 461, 485-88 (calling on states to “recogniz[e] that
indigent defense systems must operate in a world of limited resources”); see also Monica
Davey, In Missouri, State Budget Problems Take Toll on Lawyers for the Indigent, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2010, at A15 (exploring the mounting difficulties indigent defenders face in the
current economic climate).
6. See Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 461, 487-88 (explaining that “[s]tates should reduce
the number of cases streaming into [indigent defense] systems” in order to “free[ ] up
resources”).
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excessive caseloads without additional cost have argued for the
decriminalization of nonserious misdemeanors.7 But, these proposals have failed to account for the deficiencies of such an approach:
decriminalization of minor crimes can be largely cost-prohibitive
and, even where successfully implemented, has failed to achieve the
desired effect.8 This Note suggests a more useful category of offenses
for what it terms “reclassification.”9 It argues that, in order to
reduce the appointment rates of indigent defenders, states should
reclassify simple possession of all illicit narcotics as a civil infraction
subject to a fine.10
Part I of this Note reviews a criminal defendant’s constitutional
right to counsel and describes the indigent defense crisis. Part II
discusses current reclassification proposals aimed at reducing the
burden on indigent defense systems and explains why these suggestions ultimately fail to address the crisis in a meaningful way. It
then proposes reclassification of criminal drug possession offenses
as a workable solution to the overburdening problem. Part III outlines how a state can implement a drug possession reclassification
and discusses the collateral consequence implications of such an
approach, arguing that reclassification efforts should include protective measures designed to avoid these consequences. Finally,
Part IV considers the political viability of this Note’s proposal.

7. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS,
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 27-28 (2009), http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/
Report.pdf; JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 198-99.
8. See infra Part II.B.1.
9. This Note uses the term “reclassification” rather than the commonly used
“decriminalization.” See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1125. The shift in
terminology is intended to avoid any negative implications that may be associated with the
latter term. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
721-22 (2005) (discussing legal moralist notions and their role in the creation of vice crimes,
such as drug possession laws).
10. See infra Part II.B.2.

2012]

DESPERATE TIMES CALL FOR DESPERATE MEASURES

1043

I. THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS
A. The Right to Counsel and Indigent Defense Systems
The right to counsel in criminal cases is a fundamental and
essential component of the American justice system.11 The Supreme
Court has declared it an “obvious truth” that a person “too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”12 Although fundamental, the right to counsel does
not apply in all criminal proceedings.13 Currently, indigent defendants are entitled to a lawyer in federal proceedings,14 in certain
pretrial proceedings,15 in state felony proceedings,16 in state misdemeanor proceedings in which actual imprisonment17 or a suspended
jail sentence18 is imposed, in state juvenile proceedings,19 and in the
defendant’s first appeal of right.20 Indigent defendants are not
entitled to representation prior to being formally charged with a

11. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“The
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to
fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”); ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID &
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL
JUSTICE 22 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE], available at http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/indigent_defense_syste
ms_improvement/gideons_broken_promise.html (“The right to counsel is one of the most
sacred principles enshrined in our nation’s constitution.”).
12. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
13. See Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a Lot) of
the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 160 &
n.126 (2009) (“[I]t is a common misconception that all criminal defendants in the United
States are entitled to assisted counsel if they cannot afford to hire a lawyer.”).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
15. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 22 (“[T]he right to counsel attaches at
... line-up identifications, arraignment, preliminary hearings, plea negotiations, and the entry
of a guilty plea.” (footnotes omitted)).
16. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (extending the Sixth Amendment’s right to assistance of
counsel to such proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment).
17. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 22 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 37 (1972)).
18. Id. (citing Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662, 674 (2002)).
19. Id. (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967)).
20. Id. (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963)).
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crime,21 in minor cases in which no imprisonment is imposed,22 nor
in discretionary appeals.23 Although not available in every instance,
a poor person’s right to counsel remains centrally important to the
American criminal justice system.24
Indigent defense systems are the vehicles through which state
and local governments provide constitutionally mandated legal services to qualifying criminal defendants.25 These systems generally
follow one of three delivery models—public defender programs,26
assigned counsel programs,27 and contract attorney programs.28
State and local governments employ these models “either singly or
in combination,”29 funding their chosen systems with state and
county monies, court costs, and other user fees.30 No matter which
model a state or locality employs, its indigent defense system is
intended to provide competent representation when such representation is constitutionally required.31 Unfortunately, many of our
nation’s indigent defense systems fall far short of this goal.32

21. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
22. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); see infra notes 139-44 and accompanying
text (discussing the constitutionality of the actual imprisonment standard).
23. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
24. See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 22.
25. See id. at 2.
26. A public defender program comprises “[a] salaried staff of full-time or part-time
attorneys that render criminal indigent defense services through a public or private nonprofit
organization, or as direct government paid employees.” CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X.
LITRAS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1999, at 2 (2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/idslc99.pdf.
27. Assigned counsel are appointed “from a list of private bar members who accept cases
on a judge-by-judge, court-by-court, or case-by-case basis.” Id.
28. Contract attorneys are “[n]on-salaried individual private attorneys, bar associations,
law firms, consortiums or groups of attorneys, or nonprofit corporations that contract with a
funding source to provide court-appointed representation in a jurisdiction.” Id.
29. Id.
30. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 41 (1995).
31. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 2.
32. See, e.g., Emily Chiang, Indigent Defense Invigorated: A Uniform Standard for
Adjudicating Pre-Conviction Sixth Amendment Claims, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443,
447-50 (2010).
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B. The Indigent Defense Crisis
America’s indigent defense systems are in crisis.33 Each year,
“thousands ... are processed through America’s courts ... either with
no lawyer at all or with a lawyer who does not have the time,
resources, or in some cases the inclination to provide effective
representation.”34 Although the right to a lawyer may be constitutionally mandated, it remains an empty promise for many defendants.35
The scope of the problem is staggering. Across the country, indigent defense systems lack adequate funding.36 As a result, offices
are often understaffed37 with attorneys who are overwhelmed by
impossibly large caseloads.38 These same attorneys are undercompensated for their labor39 and often lack basic resources, such as
modern office equipment,40 access to legal databases,41 and vital
investigative assistance.42 Attorneys in such a position have little
incentive to stay, and high turnover rates create indigent defense
systems staffed with young, inexperienced lawyers.43
33. E.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 38 (“[I]ndigent defense in the
United States remains in a state of crisis.”); see also Marcus, supra note 13, at 152 (describing
these systems “in a word” as “broken”).
34. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at v.
35. Id.
36. E.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1045 (“By every measure in every report
analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is drastically
underfinanced.”).
37. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 50-51.
38. E.g., id. at 68 (pointing to representative examples, including Miami, where “average
public defender caseloads ... have risen in the past three years from 367 to nearly 500 felonies
and from 1380 to 2225 misdemeanors”). The caseload problem is the aspect of the crisis that
this Note seeks to address. See infra Part I.C.
39. E.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 9 (“[I]nadequate compensation for
indigent defense attorneys is a national problem.”); see also Backus & Marcus, supra note 2,
at 1062 (pointing to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where defenders earn “between $18,000 and
$35,000 annually”).
40. See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 10 (noting an historic lack of
such equipment in Washington State).
41. E.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 97 (“[I]n Caddo Parish, Louisiana, ... some
public defenders ... did not have computers, and their secretary had ... to rely instead on the
courthouse’s equipment.”).
42. E.g., id. at 94 (“Often, however, defense attorneys are denied the use of experts or
investigators due to limited funds.”).
43. E.g., Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 474.
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Defendants who rely on these systems may not have access to
them at all, as strains on the justice system as a whole can combine
to frustrate the appointment of indigent defenders. Courts facing
large dockets and costs often fail to properly notify qualifying defendants of their right to counsel and may even pressure them to
waive that right.44 Prosecutors, who are themselves overburdened
with excessive caseloads,45 may speak with defendants despite
ethical obligations to neither advise nor negotiate with an unrepresented defendant, with such conversations often resulting in guilty
pleas.46 Defendants who are informed of their right and choose not
to waive it often face lengthy pre-appointment delays that can
severely prejudice their cases and incentivize them to plead guilty
rather than to continue waiting.47 And those defendants who patiently endure these pressures and lengthy delays may still end up
pleading guilty, as defense attorneys with insufficient time and
resources regularly encourage their clients to plead guilty in order
to “expedite the movement of cases.”48 With so many deficiencies
plaguing the process, few indigent defendants receive the effective
assistance of counsel that the Constitution and the Supreme Court
have guaranteed them.49
America’s indigent defense systems have been in crisis for
decades.50 This enduring dilemma has attracted considerable
44. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 88-89. Courts commonly apply such pressure “by
informing [defendants] that a request for a lawyer would delay their case or release from jail,
or that refusing a plea offer would result in a harsher sentence in the future.” Id. (attributing
such approaches to “[c]oncerns over cost of movement of the court’s docket”).
45. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 266-74 (2011).
46. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 89.
47. Id. at 85-87.
48. Id. at 50; see also GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 16 (describing these
attorneys as “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” lawyers).
49. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Ensuring the Ethical Representation of Clients in the Face of
Excessive Caseloads, 75 MO. L. REV. 771, 778-79 (2010) (“A lawyer can be smart, dedicated,
and experienced, but too much work will prevent even the best lawyer from providing clients
with ethical, effective assistance of counsel.”); Laurence A. Benner, Eliminating Excessive
Public Defender Workloads, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2011, at 33 (arguing that the underfunding
of indigent defense and resulting excessive caseloads violate the Sixth Amendment); see also
supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text (discussing an indigent criminal defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel).
50. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 50 (“Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Gideon
decision in 1963, several organizations have conducted national studies of indigent defense....
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scholarly attention for nearly as long.51 And yet, the problem
persists.52 Professor Erica Hashimoto, one of the more recent voices
to join this discussion, suggests the principal reason behind the
inefficacy of the proposals to date: Scholars have routinely argued
for more money, and these cries have regularly “fallen on deaf
ears.”53 Despite some progress,54 indigent defense has been and
continues to be “woefully under-funded.”55 And the problem is
expected to worsen.56 In 2009, twenty-two states with full financial
responsibility for their systems faced “mid-year budget shortfalls.”57
As state budgets contract, indigent defense systems become
increasingly popular candidates for further cuts.58 In light of these
deficits, it is increasingly unlikely that proposals demanding
additional fiscal resources will gain support.59 Proper indigent
Invariably these studies conveyed a grim view of defense services.”).
51. See generally Chiang, supra note 32, at 447-50 (providing a representative review of
the criticisms of the indigent defense systems from 1951 to present).
52. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 52.
53. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 465. For a recent example of a demand for increased
funding, see Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 45, at 297, 299-301, arguing “for a major
influx of money to properly fund the criminal justice system.”
54. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1103-22 (reviewing other reforms states
have implemented to improve their systems); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 55-57
(outlining past and current state efforts to increase state indigent defense funding).
55. Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN.
L. REV. 85, 87 (2007).
56. Forthcoming budget cuts are expected to further undermine indigent defense systems
across the country. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 59 (“[F]unding shortages are
guaranteed to worsen, given the country’s economic condition.”); see also id. at 59-60
(reviewing those indigent defense systems that recent budget cuts have most severely
affected).
57. Id. at 59.
58. E.g., Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 45, at 299 (“[P]ublic defenders’ offices are an
attractive target for cuts in cash-strapped times.”); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of
the American Adversarial System To Protect the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the
Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 319, 330 n.36
(2011) (“In this time of budget shortfalls, cash strapped states and localities must choose
which important services to limit or eliminate. It is hard to believe that providing indigent
defense services will win out in the competition for scarce dollars when competing against
such popular and socially valuable services as public schools, medical care, and highways, to
name a few.”); Suzanne E. Mounts & Richard J. Wilson, Systems for Providing Indigent
Defense: An Introduction, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 193, 200-01 (1986) (discussing
“the political vulnerability of defense systems” and attributing it, in part, to politicians’ desire
to appear “tough on crime” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59. See Chiang, supra note 32, at 444 (“Funding for public defense services is rarely ...
popular ... and as state and county budgets contract, the inclination to underfund ... indigent
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defense reform requires measures capable of implementation
without increased strain on state and local budgets.60 Thankfully,
one aspect of the indigent defense crisis is ripe for such reform—the
crushing caseloads that overburden indigent defense providers.61
C. Excessive Caseloads: A Leading Cause of the Problem
Excessive caseloads are a fundamental component of the indigent
defense crisis. Reports and journal articles addressing the crisis
routinely discuss the caseload problem,62 with many arguing that it
represents “the most visible sign of inadequate funding.”63 In short,
excessive caseloads are a national problem,64 one that demands a
national solution.
1. What Is “Excessive”?
Scholars often frame excessiveness as either a failure to comply
with some numerical caseload limit65 or as an inability to meet the
standard obligations of the profession.66 This Part will examine
these approaches in turn.
a. Excessiveness by the Numbers
When defining excessiveness by the numbers, most scholars rely
on the National Advisory Commission’s (NAC) 1973 proposed case-

defense systems can become nearly irresistible.”).
60. See Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 487-89.
61. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 17-18 (discussing the excessive
caseloads of several states).
62. See, e.g., id.; Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1053-59; Hashimoto, supra note 3, at
468-75; JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 65-70.
63. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 7; see also Erika E. Pedersen, Note, You Only Get
What You Can Pay For: Dziubak v. Mott and Its Warning to the Indigent Defendant, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 999, 1004 (1995) (“The direct result of this underfunding is an inability to
hire enough attorneys, resulting in overburdened case loads.” (footnote omitted)).
64. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 65 (noting that excessive caseloads are “a
problem virtually everywhere in public defense throughout the United States”).
65. See, e.g., Joy, supra note 49, at 778.
66. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 65-66.

2012]

DESPERATE TIMES CALL FOR DESPERATE MEASURES

1049

load limits.67 The NAC recommends that a full-time public defender
carry no “more than 150 felonies; 400 misdemeanors; 200 juvenile
court cases; 200 mental health cases; or 25 appeals” per year.68 If an
attorney carries the maximum in one of these categories, he is not
to handle cases from any of the others.69 Although most scholars and
national organizations have accepted “the value of these numerical
limits as a rough benchmark for determining excessive caseloads,”70
one recent report cautions against relying on these figures as the
only measure.71 This report points to other measures of excessiveness, such as an attorney’s failure to comply with the ethical and
professional requirements of representation.72
b. Excessiveness by the Quality of Representation
In measuring excessiveness by quality of representation, scholars
look to two generally accepted standards—the National Legal and
Defender Association (NLADA) guidelines and the American Bar
Association (ABA) ethics standards.73
The NLADA guidelines require defense attorneys “to make sure
that [they have] sufficient time, resources, knowledge and experience to offer quality representation to a defendant in a particular
matter.”74 The guidelines command an attorney who does not
possess these to decline cases and also to withdraw from cases if it

67. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS 276
(1973); see, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1054; Gershowitz, supra note 55, at 93.
68. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 66.
69. Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1054.
70. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 17-18; see, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, supra
note 7, at 21 (“[T]hese standards have withstood the test of time as a barometer against which
full-time indigent defender caseloads may be judged.”).
71. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 66 (“Because the NAC standards are 35 years old
and were never empirically based, they should be viewed with considerable caution.”).
72. See id. at 65-66.
73. The following review draws from the framework provided by the National Right to
Counsel Committee. Id. at 32, 65-66.
74. NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 1.3(a) (2006) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Defender_Standards/
Performance_Guidelines.
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becomes apparent that he cannot provide adequate representation
to his clients.75
The ABA outlined similar ethics standards in a 2006 ethics
opinion in which it held that “[t]he obligations of competence, diligence, and communication under the [Model Rules of Professional
Conduct] apply equally to every lawyer,” including indigent defense
providers.76 The ABA described these obligations as including
the responsibilities to keep abreast of changes in the law;
adequately investigate, analyze, and prepare cases; act promptly
on behalf of clients; ... control workload so each matter can be
handled competently; and, if a lawyer is not experienced with or
knowledgeable about a specific area of the law, either associate
with counsel who is knowledgeable in the area or educate herself
about the area.77

A lawyer incapable of fulfilling these basic responsibilities should
consider whether his or her caseload is to blame, factoring into such
a determination “not only the number of cases, but also ... such
factors as case complexity, the availability of support services, the
lawyer’s experience and ability, and the lawyer’s nonrepresentational duties.”78
Both the NLADA guidelines and the ABA ethics standards focus
on the quality of indigent defense representation.79 Both enumerate
a defense provider’s professional and ethical obligations.80 And both
require attorneys unable to satisfy these duties to affirmatively
decline or withdraw from representation.81 In short, an indigent

75. Id.
76. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, at 9 (2006)
[hereinafter ABA Opinion].
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id. (citing ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2-3 (2002), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense
/tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf).
79. See, e.g., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 74, Guideline 1.3(a); ABA Opinion,
supra note 76, at 1, 9.
80. See, e.g., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 74, Guideline 1.3(a); ABA Opinion,
supra note 76, at 1-3, 9.
81. See, e.g., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 74, Guideline 1.3(a); ABA Opinion,
supra note 76, at 4-5, 9.
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defense attorney’s caseload may be excessive when it interferes with
the quality of representation he or she is capable of providing.
2. No Matter How You Measure It, Indigent Defender Caseloads
Are Excessive
By every measure, indigent defender caseloads are “astonishingly
large.”82 Scholars and national organizations have been tracking
excessiveness by the numbers for years.83 In 2003, testimony at ABA
public hearings revealed the presence of excessive caseloads in
states across the country, including Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Virginia, and Washington.84 Summarizing this testimony,
the ABA found that indigent defense caseloads often exceed the
NAC’s recommended limits.85 In Rhode Island, felony caseloads
surpassed these limits “by 35-40%[,] and misdemeanor caseloads
exceed[ed these] standards by 150%.”86 Caseloads in one Pennsylvania county almost doubled from 1980 to 2000 without “corresponding increase[s] in staff or resources.”87
More recent reviews of indigent defender caseloads have drawn
the same conclusion—caseloads “remain shockingly high” when
compared to the NAC limits.88 In a 2006 empirical study of indigent
defender caseloads, Professors Mary Sue Backus and Paul Marcus
found that caseloads in excess of the NAC’s recommended limits are
a persistent problem, pointing to several state and county caseloads
as representative examples.89 They noted that, “[b]y 2001 the Clark
County (Nevada) Public Defender Office had juvenile caseloads at
82. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 7.
83. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 58-59.
84. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 67 (citing GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11,
at 18 n.165).
85. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 18.
86. Id. (citing Are We Keeping the Promise?: Hearing on the Right to Counsel 40 Years
After Gideon v. Wainwright Before the ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent
Defendants (2003) [hereinafter Keeping the Promise] (testimony of John Hardiman, Chief
Public Defender, Office of the Rhode Island Public Defender)).
87. Id. (citing Keeping the Promise, supra note 86 (testimony of Lisette McCormick,
Executive Director, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on Racial and Gender Bias in
the Justice System)).
88. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 471.
89. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1054-56.
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about seven times the NAC recommended limit,” with each division
carrying caseloads of almost 1500 juvenile cases.90 “In Louisiana,
[each] public defender in Rapides Parish ... ha[d] a caseload of 472
clients.”91 And things were not much better in Minnesota and
Fairfax County, Virginia, where annual caseloads exceeded 900 and
400 cases per attorney, respectively.92 A 2009 report provides the
most recent statistics available regarding indigent defender
caseloads, finding excessive caseloads in many states, including
Nevada,93 Kentucky,94 and Missouri.95 The numbers paint a clear
picture—indigent defenders across the country are carrying excessive caseloads when measured against the NAC’s nationally
recognized limits.
Setting the numbers aside, the quality of indigent defense representation is subpar, at best.96 Attorneys across the United States
lack “sufficient time, resources, knowledge and experience to offer
quality representation” to indigent defendants.97
Indigent defenders have reported that overwhelming caseloads
leave them without enough time for their clients.98 In 2005, a
Louisiana public defender told a judge, “[I]f you divide the number
of hours in a day by the number of cases [I have,] I would be allowed
to devote eleven minutes to each [client, and] it’s just not humanly
possible for me to do that.”99 Nevada attorneys reported experienc90. Id. at 1055.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1055-57.
93. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 68 (noting that caseloads remain high in Clark
County and Washoe County, where annual attorney caseloads average 364 and 327 “felony
and gross misdemeanor cases,” respectively).
94. Id. (citing Burton Speakman, Public Defenders Face Budget Problems, DAILY NEWS
(Bowling Green, Ky.), Mar. 23, 2008) (explaining that, in 2008, Kentucky’s Department of
Public Advocacy reported “caseloads ... exceed[ing] NAC standards by 40%”).
95. Id. at 69-70 (noting that, in one Missouri county, “public defenders have been
averaging 395 cases a year”).
96. See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 7 (“Taken as a whole, glaring
deficiencies in indigent defense services result in a fundamentally unfair criminal justice
system.”); cf. Benner, supra note 49, at 24 (“Today, our criminal justice system has broken
faith with [its] basic premise and forgotten its primary mission, often operating under a
presumption of guilt in which processing the ‘presumed guilty’ as cheaply as possible has been
made a higher priority than concern for the possibility of innocence.”).
97. PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 74, Guideline 1.3(a).
98. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1055-57.
99. Id. at 1055 (alterations omitted) (quoting State v. Bell, 896 So. 2d 1236, 1240 (La. Ct.
App. 2005)).
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ing “a more than 50% decrease in the amount of time available ... to
dispose of a case” between 1993 and 2001.100 In Knox County,
Tennessee, one public defender reported that her caseload averaged
“approximately 14 people per day,” and six attorneys with over
10,000 misdemeanor cases among them, reported “averaging just
less than one hour per case.”101 Kentucky’s Department of Public
Policy reported caseloads that allow “attorneys an average of less
than four hours per case.”102 And in Missouri, 2004 caseloads
demanded that public defenders “dispose of a case every 6.6 hours
of every working day.”103 These examples and others like them104
show that indigent defense providers do not have enough time to
“offer quality representation.”105
The increasing complexity of criminal cases further exacerbates
the challenges resulting from a defender’s time shortage. As one
report briefly notes, developments in science and technology and the
enactment of criminal laws accounting for such developments have
increased the need for “specialized training and greater time” in
indigent defense cases.106 Pointing to the use of DNA and other
forensic evidence, the advent of computer- or Internet-based crimes,
and the creation of sexually violent predator laws, the report concludes that these cases “are a significant burden on a defender’s
time, requiring not only specialized knowledge but often also the
review of thousands of pages of discovery and the use of experts.”107
In addition to facing the overwhelming burdens resulting from
voluminous and complex cases, many indigent defenders lack the
monetary resources required to provide quality representation.108
Funding shortages not only create overwhelming caseloads but also

Id.
JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 68.
Id. (citing Speakman, supra note 94).
Id. at 69 (quoting SPANGENBERG GROUP, ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEM 7 (2005), http://members.mobar.org/pdfs/legislation/spangenberg.pdf)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
104. See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 21 (providing further caseload statistics).
105. PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 74, Guideline 1.3(a).
106. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 76.
107. Id. (citing AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS, STATEMENT ON CASELOADS AND
WORKLOADS 7 (2007), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1297703004.49/Caseloads%20
Report%20Final.pdf).
108. See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 7.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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frequently result in a scarcity of adequate support services.109
Without proper funding, indigent defenders lack access to “resources
for training, research, and basic technology, as well as the indispensable assistance of investigators, experts, and administrative
staff.”110 For example, assigned counsel in Michigan reported unreasonable caps on fees available to hire investigators and expert
witnesses.111 In New York, some public defender offices have little
or no access to online legal research, and one large office even
lacked updated copies of New York’s penal law.112
The burdens resulting from insufficient time and resources, as
well as from the increasing complexity of criminal cases, often fall
to attorneys who lack the experience necessary to cope with them.113
For instance, “a statewide survey of [California] judges and indigent
defense attorneys ... found ‘a statistically significant correlation
between having an excessive caseload and using attorneys with less
than three years of experience’ to handle serious felony and ‘threestrikes’ cases.”114 Additionally, excessive caseloads often produce a
high turnover rate in indigent defense offices, because overwhelmed
attorneys often burn out after only a few years.115 Attorney burnout
in turn “creat[es] offices that are bottom heavy with inexperienced
lawyers more prone to mistakes and inefficiencies in case management.”116 Thus, many inexperienced lawyers face the daunting task
of handling voluminous and complex caseloads with insufficient
time and resources.

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 10 (citing Keeping the Promise, supra note 86 (testimony of Frank Eaman,
Attorney, Bellanca, Beattie & DeLisle, Harper Woods, Mich.)).
112. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 97 (citing SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE IN NEW YORK 51 (2006), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefensecommission/SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf).
113. See, e.g., id. at 69 (“Excessive caseloads within a defense program ... increase the
likelihood that inexperienced attorneys will be forced to handle serious cases for which they
are not fully qualified.”).
114. Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting LAURENCE A. BENNER ET AL., SYSTEMIC FACTORS
AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION 28 (2007), http://www.ccfaj.
org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/expert/Benner%20Systemic%20Factors.pdf).
115. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 474.
116. Id.; see also JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 65.
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When these problems persist, the quality of representation
suffers.117 In its Eight Guidelines on Public Defense Related to
Excessive Workloads, the ABA enumerates the various forms of
inadequate representation that are attributable to the excessive
caseload problem, including the failure to comply with duties
fundamental to representation.118 The Guidelines specifically mention “the failure of lawyers to interview clients thoroughly soon after
representation begins and in advance of court proceedings,” as well
as the failure to file motions and memoranda, to conduct legal research and necessary investigations, to visit crime scenes, and “to
participate in [needed] defense training programs.”119 Scholars have
argued that these “deficiencies in representation”120 can result in
conflicts of interest between existing clients,121 as well as in undesirable indigent defense policies, such as those “encouraging guilty
pleas to save resources.”122 In sum, because attorneys carrying
excessive caseloads often lack “time, resources, knowledge and

117. The quality of representation may be viewed as both a measure of excessive caseloads
and as the primary effect of excessive caseloads. Compare ABA Opinion, supra note 76, at 1-5,
8-9, and PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 74, Guideline 1.3(a), with Hashimoto, supra
note 3, at 473. Regardless of whether framed as a measure or as an effect, inadequate
representation demands an immediate and effective remedy.
118. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, EIGHT GUIDELINES
OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 4 (2009), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_
guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter EIGHT GUIDELINES]; see also
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11, at 14 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688-91 (1984)) (listing these basic duties as “advocating for the defendant’s cause;
demonstrating loyalty to the client; avoiding conflicts of interest; consulting with the
defendant on important decisions; keeping the defendant informed of important
developments; conducting reasonable factual and legal investigations or making ‘a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary;’ and bringing to bear the
necessary skills and knowledge”).
119. EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 5.
120. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 473.
121. EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 5 (citing In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal
Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Pub. Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 1990)) (“[A]n
excessive number of cases create a concurrent conflict of interest, as a lawyer is forced to
choose among the interests of various clients, depriving at least some ... of competent and
diligent defense services.”).
122. See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 473 (“[A]s a public defender becomes attuned to
his work, the guilty plea may tend to become his almost instinctive response to all but the
most serious or exceptional cases.” (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role
in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1254 (1975))).
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experience,”123 they regularly “fail to provide adequate representation for most, if not all, of their clients.”124
Whatever the measure used, indigent defender caseloads are
excessive. These caseloads far exceed the NAC’s recommended
limits and prevent such attorneys from providing quality representation to clients who have a constitutionally mandated right to the
effective assistance of counsel.125 This is a crisis in its own right,126
one that demands an immediate and effective solution.
II. RECLASSIFICATION AS A SOLUTION TO EXCESSIVE CASELOADS
Like all other aspects of the indigent defense crisis, the excessive
caseload problem waits for a solution from a society that appears to
have nothing to give.127 Unlike the other factors contributing to the
indigent defense crisis, however, the excessive caseload problem can
be addressed without the allocation of additional funds.128 Several
scholars have observed that decreasing the appointment rates of
indigent defenders in criminal cases may reduce caseloads.129 To
accomplish this, lawmakers must first limit the appointment of
counsel in state proceedings to only those defendants who have a
constitutionally mandated right to counsel.130 Then, they must
reclassify certain offenses, removing all penalties that trigger the
right to counsel.131 Reclassification proposals to date have all suggested nonserious misdemeanors as the category of cases most
appropriate for such reform.132 This Part examines these proposals
and ultimately argues that they do not provide the needed solution
—one that is nationally accessible and capable of being imple-

123. PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 74, Guideline 1.3(a).
124. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 475; see also GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 11,
at 16 (explaining that the “failure to deliver adequate defense services to the poor” is
widespread).
125. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
126. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 475.
127. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 59.
128. See Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 485-88.
129. Id.; see, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 27-28; Backus & Marcus, supra note 2,
at 1125.
130. See Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 497-98.
131. See, e.g., id. at 498-99.
132. See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 27-28.
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mented at little or no cost to the states.133 Instead, this Note argues
that reclassification efforts should take a bright line approach and
attack the caseload problem at one of its primary sources: the
overwhelming number of state drug possession prosecutions.134
A. When the Right to Counsel Does Not Apply: Amending
Appointment Statutes To Conform with Supreme Court Precedent
The right to counsel does not apply in every state criminal
proceeding.135 Currently, states can decline to appoint an attorney
(1) prior to filing formal charges,136 (2) in minor cases in which no
imprisonment is imposed,137 and (3) in discretionary appeals.138 This
Note focuses its proposal on the second of these categories, arguing
that states should reclassify drug possession cases as minor offenses
for which imprisonment may not be ordered. Before exploring this
argument, it is necessary to briefly review the constitutionality of
denying indigent defendants appointed counsel when they are not
sentenced to a form of imprisonment.
In interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel139 and the
incorporation of that right against the states,140 the Supreme Court
adopted what some jurists and scholars have called the “actual
imprisonment standard.”141 First enumerated in the Court’s 1972
decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the actual imprisonment standard demands that “no person ... be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial.”142 The Court clarified this
standard in two subsequent cases: Scott v. Illinois143 and Alabama

133. See infra Part II.B.1.
134. See infra Part II.B.2.
135. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 160-62.
136. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
137. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
138. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616, 618-19 (1974).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
140. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340, 342-45 (1963).
141. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 757 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Scott, 440 U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marcus, supra note 13, at 145.
142. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
143. 440 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1979) (rejecting the argument that indigent defendants are
entitled to counsel when merely threatened with the possibility of imprisonment).

1058

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1039

v. Shelton.144 Based on these decisions, states may constitutionally
deny indigent defendants court-appointed counsel so long as those
defendants are not sentenced to an actual or suspended term of
imprisonment.145 Although the actual imprisonment standard has
been the subject of both judicial146 and scholarly147 criticism, it remains the baseline standard in right to counsel inquiries. States
seeking to address the deficiencies of their indigent defense systems
can thus employ this standard to help ease the burden of excessive
caseloads.
Despite the Supreme Court’s enumerated standard, the vast
majority of states offer court-appointed counsel to indigent defendants, even in cases in which it is not constitutionally required.148
In 2009, forty-six states provided counsel in “all, or virtually all,
criminal cases,”149 with only four states requiring “a sentence of
actual imprisonment for a defendant to be entitled to court-appointed counsel.”150 In light of these broad appointment practices,
before a state may employ the Supreme Court’s actual imprisonment standard to reduce caseloads, it must “amend relevant statutes so that defendants have a right to counsel only when they are
constitutionally entitled to it—that is, when they actually receive
sentences of imprisonment or probation enforceable by imprisonment.”151
144. 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (holding that a suspended sentence that may “end up in the
actual deprivation of a person’s liberty” may not be imposed unless the defendant was
accorded “‘the guiding hand of counsel.’” (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40)).
145. See Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 497.
146. See, e.g., Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 47 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Nor can I agree with the
new rule of due process, today enunciated.... It seems to me that the line should not be drawn
with such rigidity.”).
147. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 13, at 187 (“The Supreme Court’s limitation of the
constitutional right to cases in which imprisonment is actually to be imposed made little sense
thirty years ago, and it makes even less sense today.”).
148. See Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 498.
149. Marcus, supra note 13, at 164 & n.140 (listing all states that “provide counsel in
criminal cases” and the statutes authorizing such provision).
150. Id. at 165 & n.146 (listing the four states that currently follow the actual
imprisonment standard: Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, and South Carolina).
151. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 498-99. Although most states do not currently favor the
actual imprisonment standard, those faced with overwhelming caseloads and scarce resources
may wish to rethink their current approach to indigent defender appointment practices, as
doing so will allow them to address the caseload problem without sacrificing limited resources.
It is important to note that bringing state appointment practices in line with Argersinger
will not bring caseloads down to acceptable levels. Rather, it is the first step to achieving this
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Once states have aligned their appointment statutes with the
actual imprisonment standard, they may employ that standard to
reduce excessive indigent defense caseloads by simply removing the
possibility of actual or suspended terms of imprisonment from
certain statutes.152 The Argersinger Court itself contemplated the
possibility of such reclassification, stating that, in adopting the
actual imprisonment standard, it did not intend to “sit as an
ombudsman to direct state courts how to manage their affairs” and
recognizing that “[how] crimes should be classified is largely a state
matter.”153 The Court even suggested that “[o]ne partial solution to
the problem of minor offenses may well be to remove them from the
court system” altogether.154 Many scholars have since adopted this
suggestion, proposing the reclassification of “certain non-serious
misdemeanors” as a means of reducing indigent defender caseloads.155
B. Reclassify What?: The Class of Cases Most Appropriate for
Reclassification
In recent years, scholars have become increasingly supportive of
reclassification as a solution to the excessive caseload problem.156
Most seem to agree that “removing ... cases from the criminal
docket”157 would not only reduce caseloads but would also allow the
resulting “savings to be used to fund other defense expenses.”158
This Note agrees with this characterization, but questions the
category of cases most appropriate for reclassification.
aim. See id. at 497-99 (recognizing that taking this step will help to reduce caseloads but also
acknowledging that states will need to further reduce the number of cases requiring
appointment).
152. See, e.g., id. at 499-500.
153. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 (1972).
154. Id. at 38 & n.9.
155. Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1125; see, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 2728; Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 499-500; JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 198-99. But see
Marcus, supra note 13, at 187 (arguing against the actual imprisonment standard).
156. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 155.
157. Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1125. Although this approach is becoming
increasingly accepted, not all agree with limiting a defendant’s access to counsel pursuant to
Argersinger. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 187.
158. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 199; see also MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 26-27;
Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 496.
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1. Minor Crimes
Proponents of reclassification universally focus on “minor
offenses”159 or “nonserious misdemeanors,”160 defining these as
“crimes that [are] currently ... punishable by imprisonment but for
which an actual sentence of imprisonment [is] only rarely ...
imposed.”161 Minor traffic offenses, public intoxication, possession of
an open container of alcohol, and possession of drug paraphernalia
are commonly cited examples of such crimes.162 Others include
“feeding the homeless, riding a bicycle on the sidewalk, fish and
game violations, and public urination.”163 Scholars proposing reclassification of these “minor crimes” argue that such offenses clog court
dockets and drain defense resources that could be better employed
in more serious cases.164 Although reclassification of these offenses
may indeed alleviate some of the burden on indigent defenders in
certain jurisdictions, the proposals to date fail to recognize the many
shortcomings of such an approach.
The primary problem with a minor crimes reclassification is that,
by definition, it cannot be implemented without imposing substantial costs on states that are already coming up short.165 Even those
who propose minor crimes reclassification acknowledge that each
state must “undertake a systematic review of misdemeanor offenses”166 to determine those offenses for which imprisonment is an
available punishment but is rarely used.167 Thus, to implement a
minor crimes reclassification, a state must conduct an individualized review of its own criminal code.168 A nationwide standard
regarding specific crimes is impossible because states take widely

159. E.g., Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 499.
160. E.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1125; JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 198;
see also MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 27 (focusing on “misdemeanor crimes [that] do not
involve significant risks to public safety”).
161. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 496; see also JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 198-99.
162. E.g., Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 499.
163. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 28.
164. See, e.g., id. at 26-27; Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 496; JUSTICE DENIED, supra note
3, at 199.
165. See sources cited supra note 4.
166. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 28.
167. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 496.
168. See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 28.
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divergent approaches to the punishment of minor crimes.169 To
illustrate, “public intoxication, possession of an open container of
alcohol, and possession of drug paraphernalia are all punishable by
imprisonment in some jurisdictions but only by a fine in others.”170
Although a nationwide reclassification standard for these crimes
would reduce caseloads in jurisdictions with laws currently authorizing imprisonment, such a standard is unlikely to have a meaningful impact on caseloads in jurisdictions that already classify such
offenses as punishable by a fine only. Such an approach would
simply fail to provide a solution to the excessive caseload problem
in these fine-only jurisdictions. Because a national standard for
minor crimes reclassification is unlikely to alleviate caseload burdens in all jurisdictions, states interested in pursuing an effective
minor crimes reclassification must proceed individually.
Proposals recommending individual state reviews have not
suggested the means by which such reviews may be accomplished.
However, one state’s recent reclassification experience is instructive.
The Hawaii House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution in 2004 calling for a review of the state’s criminal offenses for
the purpose of a minor crimes reclassification.171 In January 2005,
Hawaii’s Legislative Reference Bureau (the Bureau) issued a report
detailing its efforts to comply with the resolution.172 To determine
the scope of the problem, the Bureau began with a search of the
entire Hawaii Revised Statutes for all statutes that “denominate[d]”
or “define[d]” a “misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor.”173 This initial
review produced over 350 statutes requiring further review for possible reclassification.174 Based on the sheer volume of minor offenses
identified, the Bureau recommended “a simpler, more practical
approach,” one in which “the judiciary takes the initiative to
periodically identify those offenses that, despite the possibly serious
penalties, are routinely and consistently being disposed of with

169. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 499.
170. Id. (footnotes omitted).
171. EDWIN L. BAKER, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, DECRIMINALIZATION OF
NONSERIOUS OFFENSES: A PLAN OF ACTION, at iv (2005), available at http://www.state.hi.us/
lrb/rpts05/decrim.pdf.
172. Id. at iii.
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id. at 2-3 & n.2.
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fines.”175 Two approaches emerge from this narrative—a wholesale
review of the state’s criminal code and a vesting of discretion in
state judiciaries to recommend crimes for reclassification. States
seeking to reclassify minor crimes could follow either of these
approaches; however, significant problems exist in both.
A wholesale review of a state’s criminal code is costly and time
consuming. It requires, first, that researchers identify all crimes
classified as either misdemeanors or petty offenses for which
imprisonment is available as a punishment.176 Next, researchers
must determine the typical penalties imposed for convictions under
each of the identified statutes.177 Specifically, they must identify
those statutes that authorize imprisonment as a punishment but
under which imprisonment is rarely imposed.178 To accomplish this,
they must review a representative number of cases decided under
each identified statute.179 After completing such a review, the
Bureau in Hawaii recommended against this approach because it
was cost prohibitive: “Ideally, and to be theoretically consistent, the
full body of Hawaii law would be studied to purge it of this baggage
but the lack of resources is not unique to the judicial branch.”180 As
Hawaii’s experience suggests, the costs associated with a wholesale
review of a state’s criminal code undermine the purpose behind
reclassification—to relieve the burden on indigent defenders and
other actors at minimal to no additional cost to the state.181
Instead of conducting a costly and time consuming review of its
criminal code, a state may opt to vest its judiciary with the discretion to recommend offenses for further study and eventual reclassifi-

175. Id. at v.
176. Id. at 2 & n.2.
177. Id. at 2-3.
178. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 496.
179. See BAKER, supra note 171, at 3 (noting that the Hawaii judiciary “was able to extract
some offense statistics” but “was not able to extract a sampling of sentencing decisions for [all]
offenses”).
180. Id. at v. Although Hawaii concluded that further review was cost prohibitive, it did
not document the precise figures associated with the effort. Telephone Interview with Edwin
L. Baker, Legislative Researcher, Legislative Reference Bureau (Feb. 28, 2011) (sharing his
individual experience with Hawaii’s reclassification efforts, but not speaking on behalf of the
Bureau).
181. See Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 461, 487-89.
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cation.182 Although such an approach would reduce the cost of a
state’s reclassification efforts, it too is unlikely to achieve the state’s
goals in undertaking them. Again, Hawaii’s experience is instructive. In its 2008 decriminalization act, Hawaii adopted the procedures that the Bureau recommended in 2005.183 Proponents of the
state’s minor crimes reclassification predicted that this procedure
would facilitate review of “additional statutes ... in coming legislative sessions.”184 But such a review has not occurred—the Hawaii
judiciary has not provided the Bureau with another list of statutes
to consider for reclassification.185 Although this failure may be the
result of confusion regarding the entity in which the Hawaii
legislature vested discretionary review power,186 the point remains
that further reclassification efforts have not occurred under the
discretionary review system.187 The problem with relying on a
discretionary system, then, appears to be that those entities with
discretionary review power may opt not to exercise it.
Hawaii’s experience highlights the many shortcomings of minor
crimes reclassification. Given the disparity of state approaches to
minor crimes, states interested in such a reclassification must
proceed on an individualized basis, either by conducting a wholesale
review of their criminal codes or by vesting their judiciaries with the
discretion to recommend crimes for reclassification. The first approach is expensive and time consuming. The second has failed to
effect meaningful reclassifications. In order for states to employ
reclassification as a solution to the excessive caseload problem, they
must look beyond minor crimes for a more effective class of cases.

182. See BAKER, supra note 171, at v. Vesting such power in the judiciary is preferable
because judicial actors’ routine participation in the criminal justice system allows them to
develop a working knowledge of sentences imposed for minor crimes. Cf. id. (suggesting this
would be a “simpler, more practical” approach).
183. See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 27; see also BAKER, supra note 171, at v.
184. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 27.
185. Telephone Interview with Edwin L. Baker, supra note 180.
186. Id.; see also 2008 Haw. Sess. Laws 279, 279-80, 283-84 (describing the judiciary’s duty
to identify offenses appropriate for reclassification, as well as the Bureau’s duty to provide
lists of potential offenses to the judiciary for review).
187. Telephone Interview with Edwin L. Baker, supra note 180.
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2. Drug Possession Offenses
Reclassifying state drug possession offenses would significantly
reduce excessive indigent defender caseloads. Scholars have been
documenting the connection between these offenses and excessive
caseloads for over twenty years.188 To this day, drug possession
crimes are considered “high volume offenses,”189 that place substantial burdens on state resources.190 Further, because of the relative
unanimity among states in their approach to illicit drugs,191 states
interested in reclassification can adopt the solution that this Note
proposes without extensive or discretionary review of their criminal
codes.192
Unlike minor misdemeanors, drug possession offenses have a historic and demonstrable connection to excessive defender caseloads.
In 1990, the federal government explicitly addressed the connection
between drug prosecutions and caseloads in a proposal to shift
prosecutions of such offenses from federal courts to the states.193 In
its report, the Federal Courts Study Committee (Committee) defined
the “unprecedented numbers of federal narcotics prosecutions” as its
“most pressing problem[ ].”194 It observed that federal criminal
filings had increased by more than 50 percent since 1980 and that
drug filings had fueled this upsurge, growing 280 percent in the
same period.195 According to the Committee, drug filings accounted
for more than one quarter of all new criminal cases in 1989, with
this figure as high as two-thirds in some districts.196 These drug
188. See, e.g., Timothy R. Murphy, Indigent Defense and the U.S. War on Drugs: The Public
Defender’s Losing Battle, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1991, at 14, 16.
189. Gershowitz, supra note 55, at 116; see also Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and
Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 243 (2007).
190. See generally JEFFREY A. MIRON, THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG PROHIBITION
23-40 (2010), http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/miron/files/budget%202010%20Final.
pdf (providing a state-by-state review of arrests and expenditures related to drug prohibition).
191. See DAVID BOYUM & PETER REUTER, AN ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT OF U.S. DRUG POLICY
10 (2005) (describing the tendency of state legislatures to criminalize drug-related activity
through the enactment of stringent drug laws and the imposition of increasingly serious
penalties for such offenses).
192. See infra Part III (detailing that solution).
193. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 35-36
(1990), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc.pdf.
194. Id. at 35.
195. Id. at 36.
196. Id.
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cases composed 44 percent of the federal criminal trials and 50
percent of the federal criminal appeals that same year.197 Given the
overwhelming burden that these cases placed on federal courts, the
Committee pleaded that “[t]he federal system must not be overwhelmed with cases that could be prosecuted in the state courts.”198
The Committee recommended that future “[f]ederal drug enforcement strategy ... target [only] the relatively small number of cases
that state authorities [could not] or w[ould] not effectively prosecute.”199 But the states were not faring much better. During the
same period, Timothy Murphy of the National Center for State
Courts observed that states had witnessed “dramatic increase[s] in
drug cases,” which placed “increasingly heavy burdens” on indigent
defense systems.200 In 1993, Professor Paul Finkelman argued that
the burdens on indigent defender offices had resulted from American drug policy and that they had “hampered ... [a]ccess to justice
for the poor.”201 Both the Committee and its contemporary scholars
recognized the causal link between drug prosecutions and excessive
caseloads. This link has not abated over time.
Drug prosecutions remain “high volume offenses” in state criminal courts across the country.202 Although earlier discussions of this
link did not discriminate between drug possession offenses and
other drug crimes, recent data suggests that possession offenses are
responsible for a significant portion of state criminal proceedings.203
The FBI’s annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) provide statistics
related to “drug abuse violations.”204 The UCR defines such violations “as state and/or local offenses relating to the unlawful possession, sale, use, growing, manufacturing, and making of narcotic
drugs including opium or cocaine and their derivatives, marijuana,
197. Id.
198. Id. at 37.
199. Id.
200. Murphy, supra note 188, at 16.
201. Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1444 (1993).
202. Gershowitz, supra note 55, at 116.
203. See Arrests—Crime in the United States 2009, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Sept.
2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/arrests/index.html [hereinafter FBI Statistics].
204. Enforcement—Drugs and Crime Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm [hereinafter BJS
Statistics] (citing Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr (last visited Jan. 20, 2012)).
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synthetic narcotics, and dangerous nonnarcotic drugs such as
barbiturates.”205 This definition is sufficiently broad in its inclusion
of various illicit drugs, as well as sufficiently narrow in its focus on
only state and local offenses, to demonstrate the impact that drug
possession offenses are having on state criminal proceedings.206 The
2009 report noted that “law enforcement made an estimated
13,687,241 arrests (except[ing] traffic violations)” in that year.207
Drug abuse violations motivated more arrests than any other
offense, resulting in approximately 1,663,582 arrests.208 Arrests for
drug possession accounted for about 82 percent of these arrests.209
Based on these numbers, state drug possession offenses were
responsible for approximately 10 percent of state and local arrests
made in 2009.210
Arrest rates are not exactly equivalent to prosecution rates, but
arrest data is relevant to show the number of cases that require, at
minimum, some form of legal process before they may be dismissed
or otherwise adjudicated.211 Although recent statistics are not
available regarding drug possession defendants’ average indigency
rates, the U.S. Department of Justice released analogous statistics
for 1996 felony drug defendants.212 Indigent defense attorneys
represented approximately 81 to 84 percent of these defendants.213
This figure may not correlate exactly with state drug possession
205. Id.
206. But this definition may be overbroad in one respect—its inclusion of sale and
manufacturing, offenses that are not included in this Note’s proposal. See infra text
accompanying notes 224-28. Despite this possible overbreadth, the following figures provide
a rough but useful picture of drug possession offenses as “high volume” crimes. Gershowitz,
supra note 55, at 116.
207. FBI Statistics, supra note 203.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. This number was obtained by multiplying the percentage of drug possession arrests
(0.82) by the total number of drug abuse violation arrests (1,663,582) and then dividing the
resulting figure (1,364,137.24) by the total number of arrests in 2009 (13,687,241) and
rounding the resulting figure to the nearest percentile (approximately 10 percent).
211. See, e.g., Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 336-39, 346
(1942).
212. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 tbl.7 (2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/dccc.pdf. These statistics represented those defendants charged in “the [n]ation’s 75
largest counties.” Id.
213. Id.
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offenders,214 but it parallels commonly accepted estimates of the
rates at which state indigent defense providers are appointed in
criminal cases.215 Based on these numbers, indigent defenders are
appointed in roughly 80 percent of state drug possession cases,
which account for approximately 8 percent of all state and local
criminal prosecutions.216 Although this number represents a very
rough estimate, it demonstrates that drug possession cases continue
to place “heavy burdens ... on indigent defender offices.”217
Reclassifying drug possession as a nonjailable offense would
relieve these burdens in an immediate and effective way because
states generally take comparable approaches to their treatment of
illicit drugs.218 As a recent assessment of U.S. drug policy observes,
state “[l]egislatures have enacted progressively tougher statutes,
criminalizing more drug-related activities and imposing steadily
increasing penalties for those convicted.”219 In short, states are
tough on drug crime.220 Almost every state prohibits the “possession
or use of any ‘recreational drug,’”221 including “opium or cocaine and
their derivatives, marijuana, synthetic narcotics, and dangerous
nonnarcotic drugs such as barbiturates.”222 This near unanimity
allows for a national, bright line standard for possession reclassification instead of the individualized reviews required in the minor
crimes context.223
Scholars and states alike have begun to recognize possession
reclassification’s potential as a tool for reducing indigent de-

214. The disconnect arises because state drug possession offenders may also include those
charged with misdemeanor drug offenses.
215. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1915-16 (2007) (citing William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1997)) (stating that
more than 80 percent of criminal defendants receive “a free lawyer”).
216. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
217. Murphy, supra note 188, at 16.
218. See BOYUM & REUTER, supra note 191, at 10.
219. Id.
220. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 70.
221. NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 189 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 6th ed. 2008) (conducting
a fifty-state survey of state laws regulating cocaine).
222. BJS Statistics, supra note 204.
223. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
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fender caseloads.224 The question, then, is how to achieve this
reclassification.
III. RECLASSIFICATION: CRAFTING A STATUTE THAT WORKS
Reclassification of drug possession offenses can have a meaningful impact on state indigent defender caseloads. However, achieving
such a reform entails several important considerations, including
not only how to reclassify, but also what, if any, penalties should be
set, and how to circumvent the collateral consequences traditionally
associated with drug possession convictions.
A. Reclassification: What It Means and How To Do It
This Note proposes reclassification that eliminates criminal
penalties for drug use and possession but retains such penalties for
the retail sale and manufacture of drugs.225 Such reclassification is
distinct from legalization, which removes manufacture and sale
penalties226 in favor of “a system in which a substance is taxed and
regulated like alcohol or tobacco.”227 This Note envisions reclassified
drug possession laws that would “treat possession of small amounts
of [currently illicit drugs] like a traffic violation, with violators
subject to a citation and a small fine.”228 Under such a reclassification, drug possession would be a civil infraction rather than criminal
offense.229
224. See Gershowitz, supra note 55, at 116 (suggesting that “[a]nother possibility ... for
legislatures to keep indigent defense funding static” would be to “decriminalize high volume
offenses (such as drug possession), which would reduce the number of criminal cases and, in
turn, the need for defense counsel,” but dismissing the idea as “implausible” without further
consideration); Alex Kreit, The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider Moving
from a Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299, 299, 325 (“[I]n the
midst of the recession, many [states] are thinking about options to reform ... a bloated and
ineffective approach to drug polic[ies].”). The remainder of this Note argues against
Gershowitz’s dismissal of possession reclassification. See infra Parts III, IV.
225. Kreit, supra note 224, at 325 (citing Douglas Husak, Predicting the Future: A Bad
Reason To Criminalize Drug Use, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 105, 105).
226. See MIRON, supra note 190, at 2 (reviewing the economic implications of the two
models without advocating that states should adopt either approach).
227. Kreit, supra note 224, at 325.
228. Id. (citing Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and
Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 403-05 (1995)).
229. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 198.
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Several states have already reclassified marijuana possession
laws.230 One of the states to do so most recently is Massachusetts,
where voters approved a marijuana reclassification ballot initiative
with 65 percent of the vote.231 The Massachusetts statute serves as
the model for this Note’s proposed drug possession reclassification.
The relevant part of the statute reads:
Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary,
possession of one ounce or less of marihuana shall only be a civil
offense, subjecting an offender who is eighteen years of age or
older to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars and forfeiture of
the marihuana, but not to any other form of criminal or civil
punishment of disqualification.232

Massachusetts’s approach is desirable for several reasons. First, it
specifies that offenders are to be subject only “to a civil penalty of
one hundred dollars and forfeiture of the marihuana.”233 This
language makes clear that drug possession is a civil, rather than a
criminal offense and specifies a reasonable penalty for such infractions. Although lawmakers reclassifying drug possession offenses do
not have to fix the penalty at $100, this amount appears to be
reasonably low, while still high enough to generate substantial
revenues for states that reclassify their drug possession laws.234
Because a reclassification statute would still prohibit drug posses-

230. See Kreit, supra note 224, at 325; Robert MacCoun et al., Do Citizens Know Whether
Their State Has Decriminalized Marijuana? Assessing the Perceptual Component of Deterrence
Theory, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 347, 351-53 & tbl.1 (2009) (detailing those states that have
reclassified marijuana possession laws). This Note argues for reclassification of all illicit drug
possession, not just marijuana possession. However, marijuana possession reclassifications
are instructive.
231. Kreit, supra note 224, at 325.
232. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2011) (effective Dec. 4, 2008). The statute provides
additional requirements for juvenile offenders. See id. This Note acknowledges that such an
approach makes sense, but it is not concerned with enumerating juvenile offender-specific
penalties. Such matters are largely outside of its scope.
233. Id.
234. For example, data reveal that there were approximately 165,300 felony drug
convictions in state courts in 2006. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES,
tbl.1.1 (rev. 2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. Were each offense
subject to a $100 fine, they could have generated approximately $16,536,000 in revenue for
state and local governments.

1070

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1039

sion, the forfeiture requirement seems appropriate. Second, the
Massachusetts approach specifies that the offender shall not be
subject “to any other form of criminal or civil punishment or
disqualification,”235 thereby clearly reclassifying the offense as a
purely civil infraction. Third, it specifies the amount of marijuana
an individual may possess without exposing himself to criminal
penalties.236 Reclassification efforts should specify appropriate
personal-use standards, either through the designation of specific
amounts for each currently illicit substance, or through the establishment of a general guideline. States seeking to enumerate drugspecific limits should look beyond the “one ounce” line drawn in the
marijuana context,237 as that amount may not be appropriate for
other currently illicit substances. States designating drug-specific
limits must therefore develop standards regarding what amounts
accurately embody a personal-use standard for each substance. An
alternative approach would be to adopt a broad personal-use
standard, like the one Portugal implemented in 2001, which “defines
[personal-use quantity] as an amount sufficient for ten days’ usage
for one person.”238 Either standard would appropriately cabin drug
possession reclassifications.
States should model their possession reclassifications after the
marijuana reclassifications undertaken to date, especially the recent
Massachusetts reclassification. They should specify that offenders
will be subject only to a civil penalty, should fix the amount of the
penalty at $100 or less, and should mandate forfeiture of the substance. Such reclassifications should also clearly remove all criminal
penalties currently associated with drug possession. Further, they
should enumerate either drug-specific personal-use standards or a
broad personal-use standard, like that adopted in Portugal, in order
to clearly define the amount of currently illicit drugs that will no
longer be subject to criminal sanctions. Under this model, reclassified drug possession offenses would no longer result in actual or
suspended terms of imprisonment and would therefore no longer
235.
236.
237.
238.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L.
Id. (“one ounce or less”).
See, e.g., id.
Kreit, supra note 224, at 326 (citing GLENN GREENWALD, CATO INSTITUTE, DRUG
DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: LESSONS FOR CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG
POLICIES (2009), http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/greenwald_whitepaper.pdf).
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constitutionally mandate the appointment of counsel to indigent
offenders cited for such possession.239
B. Collateral Consequences: Insulating Those Cited Under a
Reclassified Drug Possession Statute from the Usual Consequences
of Drug Possession Convictions
Successful reclassification of state drug possession offenses will
necessarily deprive all indigent defendants of the “guiding hand of
counsel”240 whenever they are cited for such offenses. Arguably, the
most significant criticism of this deprivation is that “[e]ven minor
cases may ... carry dire collateral consequences” of which offenders
would not be aware without the assistance of counsel.241 It is true
that important collateral consequences normally follow drug possession convictions. However, the existence of such consequences
should not preclude reclassification as a solution to the indigent
defense crisis. Rather, states should shape reclassification efforts so
as to shield those currently vulnerable to such consequences from
the collateral repercussions that might follow a citation under
reclassified drug possession statutes.
1. Traditional Collateral Consequences
Collateral consequences are a real concern in drug possession
cases. For instance, even a minor drug conviction can “forever
preclude welfare benefits, public housing, student-loans, voting,
government services, hundreds of different types of jobs requiring
licensing,” and can lead to mandatory deportation for an immigrant.242 In a report on collateral sanctions, the ABA summarized
the devastating effects collateral consequences can have in a typical
drug possession case:

239. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (discussing the actual imprisonment
standard).
240. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
241. Marcus, supra note 13, at 189.
242. Backus & Marcus, supra note 2, at 1076 (citing WASH. DEFENDER ASS’N, BEYOND THE
CONVICTION: WHAT DEFENSE ATTORNEYS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COLLATERAL AND OTHER NONCONFINEMENT CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2005)).

1072

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1039

Consider a first offender who pleads guilty to felony possession
of marijuana. This offender may be sentenced to a conventional term of probation, community service, and court costs.
Unbeknownst to this offender, and perhaps to any other actor in
the sentencing process, as a result of his conviction he may be
ineligible for many federally-funded health and welfare benefits,
food stamps, public housing, and educational assistance. His
drivers license may be automatically suspended, he may no
longer be eligible for certain employment and professional
licenses, and he may be unable to obtain life or automobile
insurance. He will be precluded from enlisting in the military,
possessing a firearm, or obtaining a security clearance. If the
child of an elderly parent, he may be disqualified from serving
as a court-appointed guardian, or as executor of his parent’s
estate. If a citizen, he may no longer have the right to vote and
serve on a jury; if not, he will become immediately deportable. In
a case like this, the real punishment is imposed through the
collateral consequences of the guilty plea that may only gradually become clear.243

This example demonstrates that all reclassification efforts must
account for the collateral consequences that traditionally follow a
conviction for drug possession, because the defendant will no longer
be advised of such consequences.244
The existence of collateral consequences should not preclude drug
possession reclassification efforts altogether, but rather should
shape the reforms that states undertake. As the ABA’s review of
potential collateral consequences makes clear, even a simple marijuana offense can produce real and dire consequences for individual
defendants.245 This fact, however, has not prevented several states
from reclassifying their marijuana possession laws.246 Legislatures
243. ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, at R4-5
(2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_
newsletter/crimjust_policy_am03101a.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter C OLLATERAL
SANCTIONS] (recommending that the ABA adopt standards subsequently published in ABA,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 4-5 (3d ed. 2004), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_
standards_collateralsanction withcommentary.authcheckdam.pdf).
244. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 28.
245. See COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 243, at R4-5.
246. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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undertaking future reclassification efforts should look to these
states for guidance in drafting drug possession laws that protect
those who violate them from the harsh collateral repercussions that
currently accompany drug possession convictions.247
2. How States Can Insulate Offenders from Collateral
Consequences
The harsh reality of collateral consequences in the drug possession context, coupled with the dire necessity to reduce excessive
indigent defender caseloads, demands that lawmakers find a way to
insulate drug possession defendants from collateral consequences
while simultaneously removing their right to counsel.248 Although
states are powerless to eliminate federal consequences for violations
of state drug laws, they can adopt a combination of protective
measures that will insulate an offender from all state collateral
consequences and inform him of the remaining federal repercussions.
First and foremost, states that choose to reclassify drug possession laws in accordance with this proposal should simultaneously
waive all related, state-imposed collateral consequences. Removing
these repercussions altogether would certainly nullify any threat
such consequences currently pose to indigent drug offenders.
Second, such states should include a bar in their reclassified statutes against disqualification from state services and opportunities
based on an offender’s drug possession. Massachusetts built such a
bar into its marijuana law, explicitly mandating that:
Except as specifically provided in [the Act,] neither the Commonwealth nor any of its political subdivisions or their respective
agencies, authorities or instrumentalities may impose any form
of penalty, sanction or disqualification on an offender for
247. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2011).
248. Notably, collateral consequences may also contribute to the increasing burden on
indigent defender caseloads. See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 34 (“Th[e] vast array of
collateral consequences has a dramatic impact on the work of the defender: (1) it adds to the
research and advocacy that must be done in each case...; (2) it changes the cost-benefit
analysis in accepting a plea bargain; and (3) it places the client at greater risk of unforeseen
harm if the defender [does not] properly advise the client of the impact of the decision to plead
guilty or proceed to trial.”).
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possessing an ounce or less of marihuana. By way of illustration
rather than limitation, possession of one ounce or less of
marihuana shall not provide a basis to deny an offender student
financial aid, public housing or any form of public financial
assistance including unemployment benefits, to deny the right
to operate a motor vehicle or to disqualify an offender from
serving as a foster parent or adoptive parent.249

This approach should guide lawmakers in future drug possession
reclassifications. Following Massachusetts’s lead, reclassifications
should enumerate, with the greatest possible specificity, those state
actors who are barred from imposing “any form of penalty, sanction,
or disqualification” on the basis of a reclassified drug possession
citation.250 Reclassifications should also provide specific examples of
activities and state assistance from which an offender may not be
disqualified, as well as a disclaimer that any such list is representative rather than exhaustive.251 Incorporating such a bar against
disqualification252 is one way to protect offenders without providing
them an attorney.
Third, states reclassifying their drug possession laws should
build reporting waivers into these statutes, prohibiting any citations
issued under the reclassified statutes from being reported to state
criminal records databases or to federal authorities.253 Again,
Massachusetts provides a useful example. The state law declares
that “[i]nformation concerning the offense of possession of one
ounce or less of marijuana shall not be deemed ‘criminal offender
record information,’ ‘evaluative information,’ or ‘intelligence information’ as those terms are defined in ... the General Laws and shall
not be recorded in the Criminal Offender Record Information
system.”254 Future drug possession reclassifications should adopt
Massachusetts’s twofold approach by first redefining offenses cited
under such statutes so as to remove all designations that may
trigger state and federal reporting mechanisms, and then prohibit-

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L.
Id.
See id.
A bar that defines who is prohibited from acting and when that prohibition applies.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L.
Id.
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ing “information concerning the[se] offense[s]” from being “recorded
in” the state’s criminal records databases.255
Fourth, states reclassifying drug possession offenses should
include a disclosure waiver in their final statutes. Such a waiver
would allow an offender to deny receiving a drug possession citation
without legal consequence. West Virginia’s first possession conditional discharge statute provides a good example of such a waiver.256
Referring to a dismissal upon “fulfillment of the terms and conditions” imposed on a first-time drug offender, the West Virginia statute states that:
Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without
adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for purposes of this
section or for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities
imposed by law upon conviction of a crime.... The effect of the
dismissal and discharge shall be to restore the person in
contemplation of the law to the status he or she occupied prior
to arrest and trial. No person as to whom dismissal and discharge have been effected shall be thereafter held to be guilty of
perjury, false swearing, or otherwise guilty of a false statement
by reason of his or her failure to disclose or acknowledge his or
her arrest or trial in response to any inquiry made of him or her
for any purpose.257

Applying this disclosure waiver to the possession reclassification
context, reclassified drug offenses must explicitly declare that they
are not to be treated as an arrest, nor as a conviction for any
purpose under state law, nor “for purposes of disqualification or
disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime.”258 Such
statutes should further clarify that an offender cited under them
should be treated as though such a citation had never occurred for
all purposes other than enforcement of the penalties enumerated in
the reclassification statute.259 Finally, such statutes should specifi255. Id.
256. See W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-407 (2011).
257. Id.
258. Id. The statement regarding disqualification and disabilities is redundant when
coupled with bars against disqualification, as proposed above. See supra text accompanying
notes 251-55. States may wish to combine these provisions to avoid potential duplicity
problems.
259. See W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-407(a)-(b).
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cally permit offenders to deny ever having received a drug possession citation and should explicitly prohibit any form of perjury or
false statement findings—or any other punishments, sanctions, or
disqualifications—related to such denials.260
Lastly, states should require disclosure of all remaining collateral
consequences, including federal consequences, to the offender in an
attachment to the written citation. Shifting the disclosure responsibility to the state ensures that an offender will be notified of any
potential consequences to which he may be subjected without relying on a defense attorney to complete the notification. States could
model such a notice requirement after comparable requirements in
the traffic citation context. Washington State’s abandoned vehicle
statute is instructive.261 The statute requires an officer to
append to the notice of infraction, on a form prescribed by the
department of licensing, a notice indicating the amount of costs
incurred as a result of removing, storing, and disposing of the
abandoned vehicle, less any amount realized at auction, and a
statement that monetary penalties for the infraction will not be
considered as having been paid until the monetary penalty ...
has been paid and the court is satisfied that the person has
made restitution in the amount of the deficiency remaining after
disposal of the vehicle.262

Washington’s notice requirement is detailed and tailored to the
circumstances giving rise to the notice.263 It also vests authority in
a related regulatory body to codify the statute’s requirements in a
form notice, and it clearly delineates what is required to satisfy the
notice’s terms.264 Following this lead, possession reclassification
statutes can enumerate specific collateral consequences to which
offenders may still be subject, including all federally imposed
consequences.265 States should vest drafting and review authority in
related regulatory bodies to develop the notice language, as well as
260. See id.
261. See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.030(3)-(4) (2011).
262. Id. § 46.63.030(4).
263. See id. § 46.63.030(2)-(4).
264. See id. § 46.63.030(4).
265. The notice could be framed as “if, then” statements; for example, “If you have a prior
conviction for ‘x,’ then you may be subject to ‘y’ consequences.”
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to amend that language whenever potential exposure changes.
Finally, such notice should specify the offender’s options—either
paying the fine and potentially triggering the enumerated consequences or contesting the citation to avoid those consequences. By
requiring such notification, states put offenders on notice of all
remaining collateral consequences and thus provide them with an
opportunity to make an informed decision regarding whether to pay
the fine or to contest the citation. Adopting this measure would shift
the informational burden from the offender to the state.266 Indigent
defense attorneys who currently shoulder this burden would no
longer be required to inform offenders of the consequences of their
decisions.
Reclassification efforts that adopt all of the above-listed protective
measures should effectively shield future drug possession offenders
from many, if not all, collateral consequences. By waiving stateimposed consequences and explicitly prohibiting all state actors
from seeking to disqualify an offender based on a drug possession
citation, the reclassified statute removes all collateral consequences
accruing against the offender at the state level.267 Protective measures that remove all designations that trigger state and federal
reporting, and that specifically prohibit the recording of drug possession citations in criminal record databases, will greatly impede
the imposition of federally imposed collateral consequences.268 A
statutory right to deny the citation without legal consequence
further frustrates remaining collateral consequences.269 Requiring
detailed notification of all remaining collateral consequences puts
the offender on notice of their existence, thus informing his response
to the citation in the absence of counsel. States adopting these
266. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
267. This must be true because waiving state-imposed collateral consequences does away
with such consequences at the state level, and prohibiting state actors from disqualifying
offenders effectively ties the hands of those who would seek to impose such consequences. See
generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2011) (effective Dec. 4, 2008); W. VA. CODE § 60A-4407 (2011).
268. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2008, at 2-11 (2009), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/
228661.pdf (reviewing the complexity of state criminal records databases and the instances
of state criminal records reporting).
269. A state statutory right to deny drug possession citations may not save an offender
from federal perjury or false statement charges. Therefore, such disclosure waivers may not
be sufficiently insulating in their own right.
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measures in the context of a drug possession reclassification are
poised to significantly reduce the burden that such cases place on
their indigent defense systems.
IV. POLITICAL VIABILITY OF DRUG POSSESSION RECLASSIFICATION
AS A SOLUTION TO THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS
There is no question that drugs are controversial.270 Scholars,
politicians, and the general public have long debated the utility of
drug prohibitions.271 In this context, “[c]riticism of American drug
policy has often come at a high price.”272 As a result, even those who
willingly acknowledge the potential benefits of drug possession
reclassifications are quick to dismiss them as “implausible” particularly “[i]n a political world that prizes being tough on crime.”273 As
one observer notes, “[t]he biggest obstacle to change is decades’
worth of rhetoric.”274 This Note does not seek to resolve this controversy. Rather, it argues that the traditional controversy surrounding American drug policy should not preclude attempts to change
that policy275 but should instead shape such efforts. Recognizing
drug prohibitions as a controversial topic, this Note seeks to reframe
the discussion to avoid the question of whether American drug
policies have failed.276 Removing this central question from the
ongoing controversy would permit open discussion and allow for a
balancing of drug policy benefits and burdens. Given the growing
acceptance of marijuana reclassifications and the advent of noncon-

270. See, e.g., William L. White, Foreward to GARY L. FISHER, RETHINKING OUR WAR ON
DRUGS: CANDID TALK ABOUT CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, at ix (2006).
271. See id.
272. Id. at x (pointing to potential financial repercussions, “political harassment, and
professional scapegoating” as examples of the risks associated with such criticism).
273. Gershowitz, supra note 55, at 116.
274. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT
238 (2001).
275. Indeed, historically controversial movements have achieved political salience despite
such controversy. See, e.g., Linda F. Smith, Access to Justice in Utah: Time for a
Comprehensive Plan, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 1117, 1177 (describing the civil rights movement as
an example of such a controversy); cf. GRAY, supra note 274, at 247 (“Artur Schopenhauer said
it best: ‘All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently
opposed. Third, it is accepted as self-evident.’”).
276. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 274, at 217.
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ventional remedies to constitutional violations in the criminal
context, the time is ripe for such a shift.
A. Reframing the Debate: Forgetting About Failure and Focusing
on Collateral Consequences
Discussions of American drug policy have traditionally centered
on the issue of success. The debate occurs between “those who
contend, on the one hand, that the War on Drugs has been totally
ineffective” and those who argue, “on the other hand, that it has
been effective in preventing some amount of hypothetical consumption at the margin.”277 Those who challenge American drug policies
attack them as futile drains on government resources.278 These
challengers often point to strains on state criminal justice systems
as evidence that drug policies have failed.279 Such criticism prompts
impassioned defenses, such as those arguing that drug prevention
“spares families the anguish of watching a relative slip into the
grasp of addiction and protects society from many risks, such as
those created by workers whose mental faculties are dulled by
chemicals.”280 To overcome ongoing rhetoric, participants should
disregard the success question altogether. The issue is not whether
American drug policy has done any good, but whether the good it
has done outweighs the harm that it causes. Lawmakers seeking to
employ drug possession reclassification should introduce their
proposals by arguing that their indigent defense systems are
broken281 and that drug policies have had a hand in breaking them,
not because these policies are failing to achieve their intended

277. Seth Harp, Note, Globalization of the U.S. Black Market: Prohibition, the War on
Drugs, and the Case of Mexico, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1668-70 (2010).
278. See FISHER, supra note 270, at 10 (“[T]he United States has spent ... billion[s] to
reduce the supply of illicit drugs in this country and to reduce the demand for these
substances.... There are data that would suggest that this money has not produced the desired
results.”).
279. STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR
TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS, at xviii, 8 (1993) (“Our conclusion [is] that much of the
drug-war artillery is worthless and in many cases counterproductive.... This comprehensive
process of intensive criminalization ... undermines our criminal justice process.”).
280. FISHER, supra note 270, at 99 (quoting THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY (2002), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/192260.pdf).
281. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 152-53.
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purpose,282 but because they have resulted in a significant number
of drug possession prosecutions requiring indigent defense services.283 Reframing the discussion in this way will allow participants
to shift the central comparison from measuring the drug policy’s
purported success against its supposed failure to measuring that
success against its own collateral consequences.284 This shift may
finally allow participants to come together in an open discussion of
American drug policy.
B. The Time Is Now: Evidence that America Is Ready for an
Unconventional Solution to the Indigent Defense Crisis
America is ready to engage in such a reframed debate and is
particularly poised to consider an unconventional solution to the
indigent defense crisis. Traditional calls for more money have
“fallen on deaf ears”285 and will continue to do so given the country’s
current economic climate.286 Reclassification proposals concerning
nonserious misdemeanors are either too costly or totally discretionary.287 Additionally, such proposals lack the uniformity needed to
achieve a national solution to the ongoing crisis.288 Although drug
policy has been the subject of a longstanding, impassioned debate,
recent shifts in public opinion and in national jurisprudence289
suggest that the opportunity may be ripe to pursue drug possession
reclassification as a solution to the indigent defense crisis.
282. See FISHER, supra note 270, at 10.
283. See supra Part II.B.2. Arguably, the high number of drug possession prosecutions and
the strain that these place on government resources are evidence that our policies are
immensely successful in promoting the detection and prosecution of drug offenses. In short,
we have been so successful in implementing these policies that our nation’s criminal justice
systems have lost the ability to keep pace.
284. Others have proposed reframing drug policy discussions. However, these proposals
generally suggest recasting drugs as a social or medical problem. See, e.g., Andrew D. Black,
Note, “The War on People”: Reframing “The War on Drugs” by Addressing Racism Within
American Drug Policy Through Restorative Justice and Community Collaboration, 46 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 177, 177-79 (2007).
285. Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 465.
286. See sources cited supra note 58; see also JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 59 (noting
that pre-existing “funding shortages are guaranteed to worsen, given the country’s economic
condition”).
287. See supra Part II.B.1.
288. See supra Part II.B.1.
289. See White, supra note 270, at ix-x.
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1. Shifting Attitudes Toward American Drug Policy
States across the nation are reevaluating their positions with
respect to marijuana possession. Two states have effected marijuana
reclassifications in the last three years.290 Fourteen states and the
District of Columbia have passed laws approving the use of medical
marijuana, with at least five more states closely examining such
measures.291 Still others, most notably California, have considered
legalizing the recreational use of marijuana and taxing its sale like
alcohol.292 Although legalization attempts have been largely unsuccessful to date, advocates for reform continue to push for reevaluation of marijuana possession laws.293
Recent polls suggest that the American public is increasingly
receptive to such proposals.294 Although the current move toward
marijuana reform signals a promising environment for future debates concerning American drug policy, it by no means indicates
that America is ready and willing to embrace reclassification of all

290. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-279 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2011); see
also William M. Welchland & Donna Leinwand, Slowly, States Are Lessening Limits on
Marijuana, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-08marijuana_N.htm (discussing shifts in public opinion regarding marijuana use and
legalization).
291. Daniel J. Pfeifer, Smoking Gun: The Moral and Legal Struggle for Medical Marijuana,
27 TOURO L. REV. 339, 339-40 (2011) (listing those states that have legalized medical
marijuana as Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington and noting that
“Maryland and Arizona have approved legislation favorable to the use of medical marijuana,
but have not legalized its use” and that “New York, Illinois, Delaware, South Dakota, ... and
Kansas are in the process of considering medical marijuana laws” (footnotes omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
292. Chris Grygiel, State House Committee Kills Pot Legalization Bill, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER (Jan. 20, 2010, 1:58 PM), http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2010/01/20/
state-house-committee-kills-pot-legalization-bill/; Justin Scheck, California Voters Reject Bid
To Legalize Marijuana, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52748704506404575592694047663552.html.
293. McKay Joins Push To Make Pot Legal, SEATTLE TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A1
(describing recent efforts in the State of Washington to bring the legalization question to
voters); Marijuana Legalization Underway in Colorado, DENVER POST, July 7, 2011,
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_18430153 (describing efforts to amend the
Colorado state constitution to permit the recreational use of marijuana).
294. See Welchland & Leinwand, supra note 290 (describing the growing popular and
political support for marijuana reform).
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drug possession.295 This Note recognizes that its proposal will be
unconventional, perhaps even radical, in the eyes of many readers.
However, one recent Supreme Court decision indicates that such a
proposal may become tenable when proffered in response to
prolonged constitutional violations in the criminal context.
2. The Move Toward Unconventional Remedies for
Constitutional Violations in the Criminal Context
In its recent Brown v. Plata decision, the Supreme Court
considered what it termed “serious constitutional violations in
California’s prison system,” specifically the failure of California
state prisons to provide adequate medical treatment to prisoners
suffering from severe mental illness and serious medical conditions,
in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights.296 The Court upheld
a three-judge panel’s ruling that imposed a population limit on
California’s prison system, effectively ordering the release of 37,000
prisoners.297 The Court found that the panel’s decision did not
violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, a federal statute
authorizing the early release of prisoners under certain conditions.298 Although both the existence of a federal statute and the
central role of the judiciary in issuing the Brown injunction
distinguish the case from this Note’s proposal, the reasoning the
Court employed in sustaining the population cap speaks directly to

295. Even if states are unwilling to accept this Note’s proposal as a solution to the indigent
defense crisis, ongoing budget cuts may necessitate a reduction in their enforcement of drug
crimes. See, e.g., Bill Norton, Budget Cuts Are ‘Legalizing Drugs,’ Thomson DA Says, AUGUSTA
CHRON., May 19, 2011, http://chronicle.augusta.com/latest-news/2011-05-19/budget-cuts-arelegalizing-drugs-da-says (reporting Georgia District Attorney Dennis Sanders’s statement
that the state’s budget cuts have resulted in “fewer arrests and fewer offenders jailed for drug
offenses,” effectively “legaliz[ing] drugs in Georgia”). States faced with the prospect of
unavoidable reductions in drug enforcement laws can proactively determine the scope of such
reductions by adopting this Note’s proposal. In doing so, they can prioritize future criminal
justice expenses, rather than idly allowing the practicalities of the budget constraints to
dictate future enforcement practices.
296. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922, 1926 (2011) (“[T]he State conceded that deficiencies in prison
medical care violated prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights.”).
297. Id. at 1922-23. The Court recognized that “the required population reduction could be
as high as 46,000 persons,” but accounted for the 9,000 prisoners that had been removed
“during the pendency of th[e] appeal.” Id. at 1923.
298. Id. at 1922-23, 1948 app. A.
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the viability of future proposals designed to address serious
constitutional violations in the criminal context.
In upholding what one Justice deemed “the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history,”299 the Brown majority
emphasized that violations of California prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights were both severe and ongoing;300 that they were caused,
at least in part, by the overcrowding of state prisons;301 and that
absent a reduction in prison population, proposed remedies were
unlikely to be effective.302 The Court also emphasized the role of
California’s persistent and “unprecedented budgetary shortfall” in
limiting the availability of less severe remedies.303 That five
Supreme Court Justices were willing to uphold an order effecting
the release of thousands of convicted criminals as a viable remedy
to persistent Eighth Amendment violations in California prisons
may indicate a nascent receptiveness to nontraditional remedies for
long-standing constitutional deficiencies in the criminal context.304
Given the similarities between California’s prison crisis and the
indigent defense crisis, it is likely that America’s indigent defense
systems also require a nontraditional solution.

299. Id. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 1922 (majority opinion) (“[V]iolations in California’s prison system ... have
persisted for years.”).
301. Id. at 1923 (“Efforts to remedy the[se] violation[s] have been frustrated ... by the longterm effects of severe and pervasive overcrowding.”).
302. Id. at 1922, 1939 (“After years of litigation, it became apparent that a remedy for the
constitutional violations would not be effective absent a reduction in the prison system
population.... Without [such] a reduction ... there will be no efficacious remedy for the
unconstitutional care of the sick and mentally ill in California’s prisons.”).
303. Id. at 1939 (“The common thread connecting the State’s proposed remedial efforts is
that they require the State to expend large amounts of money absent a reduction in
overcrowding. The Court cannot ignore the political and fiscal reality behind this case.
California’s Legislature has not been willing or able to allocate the resources necessary to
meet this crisis.”).
304. “It is ... worth noting the peculiarity” of the Brown majority’s holding. Id. at 1952
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Josh Blackmun, What Do McDonald v. Chicago, Brown v.
Plata, and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd Have in Common?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 1, 2011, 12:17
AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/what-do-mcdonald-v-chicago-brown
-v-plata-and-ashcroft-v-al-kidd-have-in-common.html (identifying the common thread as “the
Court’s recognition that liberty yields both positive and negative social costs,” describing
Brown v. Plata as an instance in which the Court decided that society should bear the social
cost, and suggesting that how the Court balances liberty and social costs “differ[s] in different
constitutional contexts”).
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Like California’s prisons, America’s indigent defense systems are
“broken beyond repair.”305 Indigent defender caseloads are dangerously excessive,306 resulting in what many have argued are persistent, nationwide violations of defendants’ Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel.307 The time has come for lawmakers to provide a meaningful solution to this longstanding crisis. The
legal profession can no longer “ignore the political and fiscal reality”
facing our country’s indigent defense systems.308 States have “not
been willing or able to allocate the resources necessary to meet th[e]
crisis,” and “absent a reduction in” excessive caseloads, “there will
be no efficacious remedy for the unconstitutional” treatment of our
nation’s indigent defendants.309 If courts, including the Supreme
Court, are willing to release individuals who have been convicted of
crimes and on whom states have expended considerable resources
to prosecute and incarcerate, the time has come to consider
nontraditional solutions on the front end, specifically the reclassification of drug possession offenses.
CONCLUSION
Desperate times call for desperate measures. Our country’s indigent defense system is failing those individuals it was implemented
to protect. Given the current economic climate, there is scant chance
that the funding needed to remedy the indigent defense crisis will
305. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1927 (majority opinion); see Marcus, supra note 13, at 152 (“In
spite of enormous sums of money being spent throughout the United States on tremendous
numbers of cases, the system of providing counsel across much of our nation is, in a word,
broken.” (footnotes omitted)).
306. See supra Part I.C (discussing the excessive caseload problem).
307. See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 475 (“Lawyers carrying caseloads that far exceed
national standards cannot adequately consult with their clients or provide sufficient
representation. Ultimately, those attorneys fail to provide adequate representation for most,
if not all, of their clients, despite the constitutional right of those clients to effective assistance
of counsel.”); see also Benner, supra note 49, at 33 (arguing that such deficiencies violate the
Sixth Amendment).
308. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1939; see also Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 465 (“For years,
indigent defense advocates have clamored for more funding to address this crisis ... those
pleas have fallen on deaf ears.”).
309. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1939; see also Hashimoto, supra note 3, at 461 (“Recognizing that
indigent defense systems must operate in a world of limited resources, states should reduce
the number of cases streaming into those systems by significantly curtailing the appointment
of counsel.”).
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materialize. States need to find solutions capable of implementation
without the allocation of additional resources. Proposals suggesting
minor crimes reclassifications fail to achieve this goal because they
require a state either to conduct a substantial and costly review of
its criminal code or to adopt a vesting system that will likely fail to
effectuate meaningful reclassification.
Drug possession reclassification better satisfies the goals of undertaking a reclassification effort. By removing imprisonment as a
punishment for drug possession, such reclassification eliminates the
constitutional right to counsel in state possession cases. Given the
demonstrated impact that these offenses have on state caseloads,
such a reclassification would significantly reduce the burden on
indigent defenders. Carefully crafted reclassification statutes that
build in a combination of protective measures can achieve this goal
while simultaneously shielding offenders from and alerting them to
the harsh collateral consequences traditionally associated with drug
possession convictions.
Reclassification is something that can and should be done to
address the indigent defense crisis. To realize this proposal, lawmakers must avoid the American drug policy debate’s traditional
controversy by reframing the discussion. They must argue that the
harm drug possession laws cause outweighs the benefits that they
provide. There is a place for this argument to be made. States are
talking about drug policy, and the Supreme Court has accepted
arguments in favor of unconventional remedies to long-standing
constitutional violations in the criminal context. The time is now.
The remedy may be radical, but the problem is dire.
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